Peer-Reviewed Research

Peña-Rangel, David (2023). “Economic Inequality and the Permissibility of Leveling Down.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (forthcoming).

Abstract: I argue in this paper that the political and economic domains are analogous for distributive purposes. The upshot of this conclusion is that because we normally think that an unequal distribution of votes is objectionable even if these inequalities are strictly necessary to improve the lives of less informed voters, so we should conclude that an unequal distribution of resources might be similarly objectionable even if strictly necessary to make the worse off better off. Leveling down economic resources is therefore sometimes morally permissible. I consider and reject three types of objections to this view. 

Peña-Rangel, David (2022). “Political Equality, Plural Voting, and the Leveling Down Objection.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 21 (2): 122-164.  

Abstract: I argue that the consensus view that one must never level down to equality gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma is best understood by examining two parallel cases of leveling down: one drawn from the economic domain, the other from the political. In the economic case, both egalitarians and non-egalitarians have resisted the idea of leveling down wages to equality. With no incentives for some people to work hard social productivity will likely decline, further lowering people’s wages and thus leaving everybody all-things-considered worse off as a result—hence “never level down.” On the other hand, however, the argument against leveling down does not appear to pass muster in the political sphere: denying political equality in the form of “one person, one vote” (OPOV), for example, by giving a higher share of voting power to people with, say, more education seems straightforwardly objectionable, even if such a voting scheme would improve the outcomes of all people, including those who are ultimately left with fewer votes. Thus, a fundamental tension arises: we can either endorse the widely-affirmed “never-level- down” thesis, which says that sacrificing people’s well-being exclusively for the sake of promoting equality can never be the right thing to do, or we can endorse the principle of “one person, one vote.” But we cannot do both. I defend this dilemma against a view I call the compatibility view: roughly, that because OPOV is strictly necessary to advance some weighty, non-egalitarian interest people have, accepting OPOV as a principle of justice is compatible with one’s rejection of leveling down.

Peña-Rangel, David (2013). “The Ties that Bind Us: Kymlicka on Culture and Education.” Theory and Research in Education 11 (1): 23-41.

Abstract: Most societies today are culturally diverse. Increasingly, minority groups are demanding recognition and self-governing rights to protect their ways of life against that of the majority. These demands represent a serious challenge for the state: how is it to balance between the equally legitimate claims of the many cultures inhabiting its territories, all the while promoting a set of common practices and democratic institutions? In several influential publications, Will Kymlicka has offered persuasive answers to those questions. This article examines his theory, with particular emphasis on the distinction he draws between what he calls national minorities and polyethnic (or immigrant) groups. 

Peña-Rangel, David (2013). “Constitucionalismo popular contestatario.” Isonomía 38: 225-243 (“Contestatory Popular Constitutionalism”). 

Abstract: Democracy is best understood as system of self-governance. The Constitution, insofar that it is, so to speak, controlled by the few, presents a challenge for the democratic ideal. Popular constitutionalism is a direct response to the contradictory arrangement found in most of today’s constitutional democracies: why should only a handful of citizens, removed from everyday politics, interpret a Constitution that ties and binds all members of the community alike? Interpreting the meaning of the Constitution, populists argue, should be a deliberative endeavor between the people, their representatives, and members of the judiciary. This essay analyzes the populist claim. Instead of having deliberation guide a community’s effort to interpret the Constitution, I will argue that contestation—a specific form of deliberation that ensues after a decision has been made by the Supreme Court—take its place. 

Leveling Down, All Things Considered

Description: This is a book about one very popular objection to equality. That objection was expressed by Churchill as the “equal sharing of misery”—the idea that, in order to promote equality, we will sometimes have to sacrifice the good of people by leveling down the better off to the condition of the worst off: we will have to sometimes reduce their wealth, or opportunities, or access to education, or something else. The leveling down objection has considerable rhetorical force. My aim in this book is to evaluate the strength of the objection, survey some egalitarian replies, and ultimately argue for the permissibility of leveling down in some cases, under certain circumstances, with respect to some goods.  

Are We Socially Related to Non-Nationals?

Abstract: Relational equality is most naturally understood as making the claim that if people are related to each other, then they ought to relate to one another as equals. In my view, this means that a collection of people who are relevantly related have a particular complaint against a distribution that constitutes, expresses, or causes a hierarchical ordering between them. When it comes to global distributions like the distribution of wealth between members of Denmark and members of Ethiopia, Lithuania, or Portugal, for example, what we want to know is whether the Danish and Ethiopians are genuinely related: whether there is something to their relationship that is in some ways analogous to the relationship between New Yorkers and, say, Californians. If this turns out to be the case, then perhaps we can import some of the conclusions that seem to hold for relationships within Denmark to relationships that, on reflection, hold between Denmark and other parts of the world. If the global distribution of wealth or political opportunities ranks people into groups of different worth—subordinating some to others—then there might be a Parallel-Case Argument to be made here between the domestic and the international domains.

Productive Justice as Distributive Justice 

Abstract: Consider the following two claims. First, society ought to aim, as a matter of justice, for continued economic growth over generations, “onwards and upwards indefinitely,” to borrow from Rawls. Second, society ought to ensure, as a matter of justice, that the worst off are not that much worse off: society must guarantee that no one falls under an adequate threshold of well-being. My question is how these two claims, and claims like these, fit together. The first claim is a claim about what might be called productive justice: it specifies how much we ought to produce. The second claim is a claim about distributive justice: it says how we should distribute what we produce. It seems that these types of claims are normatively related, and might conflict with one another. Suppose we already produce enough to keep everyone above the sufficiency threshold: is there a reason why society ought to do more, to keep on growing indefinitely into the future? This would be the case if, for example, continuous economic growth would be needed to guarantee that no one would eventually fall under a sufficiency threshold—in, say, 100 or 1000 years down the line. But suppose this is false: suppose birth rates are consistent with replacement rates. Or, in a different direction, suppose that the distributive pattern needed to keep up production is given by considerations of merit or desert: people will not work as hard unless they feel they are being rewarded according to their contribution. Should we conclude then that either (1) or (2) must be false? Or, to put the question differently, can both these claims—(1) and (2)—simultaneously be true? They can be if questions of productive justice are independent from questions of distributive justice: if they are not as closely related, as I suggested above. This is the question I explore here. 

Accountability & the Ethics of Electoral Coalitions

Abstract: Are some coalitions among political parties undemocratic? Or, to back up and not presuppose the objection, is there a problem to be explained here when political parties decide to build an electoral coalition that has the effect of reducing the amount of political options to be voted for by citizens? Consider Katz and Mair’s (1992; 2009; 2018) “Cartel Party thesis,” which roughly states a tendency in advanced democracies for political parties to collude with one another in order to secure state funding and benefits. There are several different objections to the cartelization of political parties. As Katz and Mair themselves suggest, many objections to this kind of arrangement appear to be straightforwardly instrumental. When Left joins Right one might suspect that Left and Right will each have to compromise on policy. This might be bad for both partisans of Left and Right, who will rarely if ever see their principles reflected in the basic institutions of society. This might also be bad for the realization of justice if Left’s view (or Right’s) more closely resembles what justice requires. But there seems to be a further objection that survives here even if one were to stipulate away these sorts of concerns: perhaps because a mixed view of Left and Right is actually what justice requires, or perhaps because this sort of unity allows parties and partisans to work closely together and pursue policies oriented towards the common good. The further objection I have in mind is about how this sort of arrangement is antithetical to democracy. Take two common views about democracy’s value. According to some, democracy promotes, constitutes, or realizes the distinct value of equality. According to others, democracy promotes, constitutes, or realizes the distinct value of freedom, self-government, or autonomy. Both these views seem plausible: in democracy we govern ourselves under conditions of equality. The question is whether the cartelization of political life erodes these two grounding features of democracy: are some coalitions undemocratic because they undermine—in some yet-to-be-specified sense—citizen’s freedom and equality?

The Ethics of Partisanship

Abstract: Normative and ideological commitments one takes to be correct are sometimes said to justify (perhaps require) keeping quiet when one’s favored political party (on ideological grounds) contravenes those normative or ideological commitments: (i) a commitment to pacifism ought to prevent me from speaking out against Obama’s drone killings; (ii) a commitment to women’s right to choose ought to stop me from criticizing the Left’s unwillingness to promote legislation that would decriminalize abortion. Statements (i) and (ii) appear to be inconsistent: what I ought to do on behalf of my party seems to run counter to the normative commitments that attracted me to that party in the first place. And yet this type of stance is pervasive in democratic societies. My aim is to evaluate whether this putative inconsistency can be resolved, and in what way.